The "Blackout of 2003" struck on an August afternoon, darkening households and businesses for 49 million people. While troublesome, the impact of this unusual event on JSTOR's availability was minimal. Network performance slowed, but for those users with power, access to JSTOR was never lost. Even so, the blackout underscored for us the differences between the two key elements of our mission.

JSTOR is first an archive with a responsibility to preserve the content entrusted to us. The blackout did not threaten this aspect of our charge. Yet scholars rely on JSTOR not only to preserve the content, but to provide consistent access to it. Here, we are all vulnerable to the vicissitudes of electronic communications, and the problem exists on both the "server" and "client" side of the equation. In this case, JSTOR's redundant servers in Ann Arbor and Princeton proved sufficient to maintain continuous access. However, had our Princeton servers been caught in the same power surge that affected Ann Arbor, access to JSTOR would have been interrupted until power was restored. And regardless of JSTOR's availability, millions of users who lost local power could not access any electronic resources.

To be sure, the temporary loss of access is not a long-term failure. But if one's work depends on electronic resources, the blackout may have ranked as a significant disruption. This recognition of our collective vulnerability has prompted thoughtful discussion among JSTOR staff about what level of "up time" certainty is necessary and what options for reducing that vulnerability are available and affordable. Perhaps your institution has engaged a similar discussion in the wake of the blackout. No conclusion has yet been reached, but we will be sure to inform the community as our ideas develop. Your input into these and other questions are welcome and valued.

Michael P. Spinella

Last updated on September 8, 2006